Is Africa Integrated in the Global Economy? by Arvind Subramanian & Natalia T. Tamirisa
352
IMF Staff Papers
Vol. 50, No. 3
© 2003 International Monetary Fund
Is Africa Integrated in the Global Economy?
ARVIND SUBRAMANIAN and NATALIA T. TAMIRISA*
The popular impression that Africa has not integrated into world trade, as suggested
by the evolution in simple indicators, has been called into question recently by more
formal analysis. This paper refines and generalizes this analysis and lends support
to the popular view of disintegration, but only for countries in Francophone Africa.
These countries are currently underexploiting their trading opportunities and have
witnessed disintegration over time, a trend that is most pronounced in their trade
with technologically advanced countries. There is some evidence, on the other hand,
that countries in Anglophone Africa are reversing the trend of disintegration, par-
ticularly in their trade with advanced countries. [JEL C1, F1, O4]
T
he state of the current debate on globalization can generally be summarized as:
yes, it confers enormous benefits, but it also poses great challenges. In the case
of Africa, however, even the first part of this proposition is not uncontested—
globalization’s benefits have largely proven elusive for Africa.1 Reaping these
benefits is predicated on embracing globalization in the first place. Has Africa
done so—has it globalized or has it been marginalized from world trade? On this
question, there seems to be an uneasy tension between two views, with distinct
policy implications.
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1In this paper, Africa refers to sub-Saharan Africa. Globalization refers to integration of goods mar-
kets through international trade and not to capital market integration.According to the first, popular view, Africa has missed out on the opportuni-
ties offered by globalization simply because it has not globalized. The statistic that
is commonly invoked in support is a dramatic decline in Africa’s share of world
exports during the past three decades, representing a “staggering annual income
loss of US$68 billion—or 21 percent of regional GDP” (World Bank, 2000).
Reviving trade is therefore integral to Africa’s economic fortunes, a view that is
consistent with the research evidence demonstrating the benefits of integration
(Sachs and Warner, 1997; and Collier and Gunning, 1999). 
The second view is that Africa did take advantage of trading opportunities in
line with the evolution in its income and development. Academic support for this
view comes from the spate of evidence that demonstrates that Africa does not trade
too little: it is an average trader, trading just as much as can be expected given the
underlying determinants of trade, such as income, geography, and size (Foroutan
and Pritchett, 1993; Coe and Hoffmaister, 1999; and Rodrik, 1999).2
These views lead to distinct policy implications. The former sees Africa’s
declining trade as a source of concern and accordingly places considerable empha-
sis on policy measures to expand trade opportunities (World Bank, 2000; Sachs,
2000). The latter view sees causality running from growth, and other determinants,
to trade and hence is less activist toward, or at least sees less urgency in, the need
to promote trade (Rodrik, 1999).
The evidence provided by the recent literature, however, has a number of lim-
itations. The literature focuses on selected, rather than all, components of Africa’s
trade. It is based on a relatively narrow, rather than a general, benchmark for
assessing what “average” or “typical” trade is. It treats Africa as a uniform region,
failing to distinguish intraregional specificities. Lastly, econometric methodolo-
gies employed in estimating Africa’s trade could be refined further. 
This paper—which focuses on the second of the two strands in the literature
described above—seeks to remedy these limitations. It revisits the puzzle of
Africa’s trade to shed light on the key underlying issues: whether Africa under-
trades or overtrades, and how its trading pattern has changed over time. 
We  find that countries in Francophone Africa are currently underexploiting
their trading opportunities and have witnessed disintegration over time, a trend that
is most pronounced in their trade with technologically advanced countries. There is
some evidence, on the other hand, that countries in Anglophone Africa are revers-
ing the trend of disintegration, particularly in their trade with advanced countries.
A robustness analysis points to two possible explanations for the contrasting
experiences of Francophone and Anglophone Africa. Higher trade-related transac-
tion costs, possibly due to greater inefficiencies in key infrastructure services, and
currency arrangements in Francophone Africa may have contributed to its rela-
tively inferior trade performance. The results are robust to the inclusion of vari-
ables that control for primary-commodity dependence. That is, the results do not
reflect the fact that disintegration is due to Francophone African countries being
primary commodity exporters.
IS AFRICA INTEGRATED IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY?
353
2Easterly and Levine (1997) suggest that a lot of factors not strictly related to trade, including geog-
raphy and ethnic divisions, help explain Africa’s poor growth performance.I. Background 
Statistics on the evolution in Africa’s share of world trade visually suggest that
Africa is progressively disintegrating or marginalizing from world trade
(Figure 1). The top panel shows that Africa’s share of world exports declined
from over 4.1 percent in 1980 to about 1.6 percent in 2000, while its share of
world imports declined from over 3.2 percent to 1.3 percent over the same period.
More disturbingly, the bottom panel suggests that Africa’s share of trade in com-
modities has also declined significantly from about 8 percent in 1980 to about 4.4
percent in 2000. Thus, the disintegration from trade is not, or not just, due to a
less-than-average performance in manufacturing, in which Africa may not have
comparative advantage.
A series of recent papers have subjected this impression to a formal empirical
scrutiny by asking the question of how typical Africa’s trade is relative to a pre-
selected theoretical benchmark. The salient features of these papers are summa-
rized in Table 1.3
Foroutan and Pritchett (1993) use data on trade, excluding that in primary
commodities, for the early 1980s to test whether African trade is unusual. Their
sample comprises 53 low- and medium-income countries (with per capita GDP
less than US$3,000) as reporting countries and 95 partner countries. Thus, the
benchmark of what constitutes typical trade is trade of the countries that are sim-
ilar to African countries. The gravity model is estimated using the Tobit procedure.
Foroutan and Pritchett (1993) find no evidence that African countries trade less
with each other than other developing countries. In fact, intra-African trade is
higher than expected when trade is measured in terms of exports. 
Coe and Hoffmaister (1999) test whether Africa’s trade is unusual by examin-
ing trade flows between developing and industrial countries during 1970–97. They
apply a nonlinear procedure to estimate the gravity model and find that in the
1970s Africa overtraded with the North relative to other countries’ trade with the
North and that over time this overtrading has declined. In the 1990s,Africa’s trade
was no different from the average developing country’s trade with the North. 
The model, however, does not control for a key variable, the preferential trad-
ing arrangement between the European Union and Africa under the Lomé
Convention. Hence, it is difficult to assess whether the Africa dummy is merely
picking up the effects of this preferential trading arrangement.4 Indeed, the decline
in the magnitude of overtrading with the North is consistent with the decline in
preferential margins under the Lomé Convention as most-favored-nation tariff
rates in Europe have declined and as Europe has entered into other preferential
trading arrangements. 
This paper encompasses the earlier body of work, yet differs from it in a
number of ways. First, the paper explores African trade in its entirety. In other
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3Rodrik (1999) tests whether Africa’s aggregate rather than bilateral trade is unusual, after controlling
for size, income, and average distance from the world. The paper does not employ a strict bilateral gravity
model, but like other authors, Rodrik finds that Africa’s trade is not dissimilar to other countries’trade. 
4In Foroutan and Pritchett (1993), the Lomé dummy variable has a positive and statistically signifi-
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Figure 1. Africa’s Share of World Trade, 1980–2000
Sources: The IMF’s World Economic Outlook for the top panel and the World Bank’s World
Development Indicators for the bottom panel. Primary commodities comprise fuel, ores, metals, and agri-
cultural products. Data on primary commodities are available only for selected years.
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B. Trade in Primary Commoditieswords, we test for the typicality of Africa’s overall trade, its trade with other
African countries, and its trade with developed and developing countries. The
earlier studies cited above, in contrast, examine the typicality of a selected com-
ponent of African trade. 
Second, instead of treating Africa as a homogenous region, we disaggregate
Africa’s trade into that of Central and Western Africa (which we refer to as
Francophone Africa) and of Eastern and Southern Africa (referred to as
Anglophone Africa). Such a disaggregation appears to be warranted in view of
notable differences between these groups of countries in terms of institutions,
policies, and the overall approach to regional and global integration, and is vali-
dated by our findings.5
Third, the paper uses a global benchmark for assessment. It seeks to answer
whether Africa’s trade—and all its components—differ from those of a broad
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Note: NLS is nonlinear least squares.
5Language is not a criterion for disaggregation in this context. Indeed, in modeling we control sepa-
rately for commonality of language (and through this partially for historical similarities) among countries.group of countries. The sample comprises 73 industrial and developing countries,
of which 16 are in sub-Saharan Africa.6 Thus, the benchmark for evaluating “aver-
age” trade is a general one, unlike in Foroutan and Pritchett’s (1993) paper, which
asks whether African trade is different from trade of low- and middle-income
countries, or in Coe and Hoffmaister’s (1999) paper, which examines whether
Africa’s trade with the North is different from other developing countries’ trade
with the North. Notwithstanding the above, our framework is flexible enough to
permit testing the robustness of results to alternative benchmarks.
Finally, the paper employs nonlinear least squares (NLS) to adequately
address the problem of zero-valued observations (similarly to Coe and
Hoffmaister, 1999) and relies on bootstrapping to make hypothesis testing valid
given the nonnormality of residuals.7
II. Methodology
The most commonly used analytical framework for studying bilateral trade flows
is the gravity model, and it is well suited for addressing the questions posed in this
paper. There are numerous successful empirical applications of the gravity model
dating back to the early 1960s.8
The gravity model relates a measure of bilateral trade to the economic mass of
the two countries and the distance between them:
TRADEijt = (Yit Yjt)α (Pit Pjt)θ Dijβ eµij,( 1 )
where TRADEij is bilateral trade between country i and country j, Yi is nominal
GDP in country i, Yj is nominal GDP in country j, Pi and Pj are population in the
two countries, Dij is geographic distance between country i and country j, and t is
a time subscript. We expect trade to be positively affected by economic mass
(α> 0); negatively related to the level of population (θ < 0), indicating that larger
countries tend to be more self-sufficient or, alternatively, that poorer countries—
countries with larger populations for a given level of GDP—trade less than richer
countries; and negatively related to distance (β < 0). µijt is given by
µijt = κ + ϕλτ,( 2 )
where κ are fixed effects for trade between African and other countries, ϕλτ are
fixed effects for other potential determinants of bilateral trade (specifically, for
membership or participation in the Lomé Convention and the CFA franc zone and
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6The 16 sub-Saharan African countries in our sample account for close to 90 percent of the total trade
of sub-Saharan African countries. South Africa is excluded from the sample, given the focus of the paper
on the poorer countries of sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover, South Africa’s trade data might be distorted:
after the demise of apartheid in the early 1990s, the level of recorded trade increased dramatically with-
out necessarily a corresponding increase in the underlying level of trade. 
7Coe and Hoffmaister (1999) assume that residuals are normally distributed and use the NLS esti-
mator without bootstrapping. 
8See Frankel (1997), Helliwell (1998), and Coe and Hoffmaister (1999) for a discussion of earlier
contributions.for countries that share common borders or a common language). We assume that
disturbances are independent and identically distributed and enter equation (1)
additively.
Recent papers by Deardorff (1998) and Anderson and van Wincoop (2003)
emphasize the importance not only of distance (or trade barriers) between two
countries, but also of the average trade barriers of the two countries to all their
other trading partners. The empirical gravity model literature often includes a
remoteness variable, defined in some studies as the weighted distance to all trade
partners,9 as a proxy for this:
Ri = ΣjwjDij,( 3 )
for i≠ j and with wj =Y j / ΣiYi for all i. A similar variable is defined for country j.
The more remote a pair of countries is from the rest of the world, the more they
will tend to trade with each other.
Thus, the specification we estimate is10
TRADEij = (YiYj)αDijβ(PiPj)θ(RiRj)γeµij + εij (4)
This formulation allows straightforward tests of whether, after controlling for
the economic size, distance, remoteness, and other factors, bilateral trade between
or within regions in Africa is different from trade of other regions—the test is sim-
ply whether the estimated fixed effects (κ are significant. 
The model is estimated for three points in time—1980, 1990, and 2000. This
serves as both a comparison with and an update of other work conducted for ear-
lier periods and also facilitates the analysis of evolution in trade over time. Data
and their sources are described in Appendix I. 
Following Coe and Hoffmaister (1999) and similar to Coe, Subramanian, and
Tamirisa, with Bhavnani (2002; hereafter CST, 2002), we employ NLS estimation
on a sample that includes zero-valued observations for bilateral trade. Since
Africa’s trade is relatively concentrated, the share of zero-valued observations in
the dataset is not trivial (about 6–11 percent between 1980 and 2000), and thus the
choice of an appropriate methodology critically depends on how a given estimator
deals with zero-valued observations. The main advantage of an NLS estimator is
that it adequately incorporates the information contained in zero-valued observa-
tions by treating them as cases where trade is actually zero rather than negligible
or not observed. CST (2002) also confirm the advantage of the nonlinear estima-
tion procedure employed in this paper over the alternatives.
Critical values for hypothesis testing are obtained by bootstrapping with
1,000 replications, since skewness and kurtosis tests indicate that residuals are not
Arvind Subramanian and Natalia T.Tamirisa
358
9Our specification of remoteness is similar to that in Frankel and Wei (1998). 
10Instead of remoteness, Anderson and van Wincoop (2001) propose a “multilateral resistance” term
that is a function of equilibrium price indices, which are not observable. Anderson and van Wincoop are
able to estimate their model using demanding computational methods. Coe, Subramanian, and Tamirisa,
with Bhavnani (2002), however, show that in the nonlinear framework, the specification with fixed effects
yields similar effects to that with remoteness. distributed normally. Hypothesis testing under the assumption of residuals’ nor-
mality would be invalid in this case.Point estimates, in contrast, are independent
of the distribution of residuals.
There are two alternatives to the methodology we employ. The first is to
exclude zero-valued observations (as in Frankel, 1997) from the sample. However,
this would be equivalent to nonrandom screening of the data and could bias the
results. It would also be unsatisfactory from a conceptual point of view, since zero
values in our data set indicate the lack of trade, not missing values. Given our
focus on Africa’s trade, which has a disproportionate share of zero-valued obser-
vations (about double the share for the entire sample), including zero-valued
observations is desirable in this study.
The second alternative is to assign arbitrarily small values to the zero-valued
observations and then estimate the model in the logarithmic form. This is the
approach adopted in Wang and Winters (1991) and Foroutan and Pritchett (1993).
However, using ordinary least squares (OLS) and Tobit estimation procedures on
a sample in which zero-valued observations are replaced with small values is not
free from problems either. Since the logs of small values are large negative num-
bers, this approach confers unduly large weights on the adjusted zero-valued
observations. We compare below the results obtained from using these alternative
methodologies to our results.
III. Africa’s Trade
Africa’s trade is not uniform. In particular, there are important differences in the trade
performance of Anglophone and Francophone Africa in the past two decades (Figure
2). After declining during most of the 1980s,Anglophone Africa’s overall trade grew
markedly through 2000. Francophone Africa’s trade has grown more steadily, but
without the dynamism exhibited by Anglophone Africa since the late 1980s. For
Anglophone Africa, the largest increases were recorded in its trade with the South and
within the region, while trade with the North grew at a slower pace. While
Francophone Africa’s trade exhibited a similar geographic pattern, with trade with the
South growing faster than trade with the North, the magnitude of growth rates in trade
in each of these markets has been well below that for Anglophone Africa. 
In the formal analysis, we represent the different components of African trade
by various dummies. (See Appendix II for a list of the countries that are included
in the dummies.) AFR-ANG is a dummy for Anglophone Africa and takes on a
value of 1 when an Anglophone African country is either a reporting or a partner
country. AFR-FRN is the analogue for Francophone Africa. The other dummies
are all bilateral. The AFRAFR-ANG (AFRAFR-FRN) dummy represents trade
among Anglophone (Francophone) African countries. Similarly, AFRS-ANG
(AFRS-FRN) denotes Anglophone (Francophone) African countries’ trade with
other developing countries.
AFRNNEU-ANG (AFRNNEU-FRN) denotes Anglophone (Francophone)
African countries’trade with advanced11 countries other than those in the EU that
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Figure 2. Africa’s Trade, 1981–2000
(Billions of U.S. dollars)
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A. Africa as a Whole B. Total Trade and Trade with the North
C. Trade with the South D. Intraregional Tradegrant preferences under the Lomé Convention.12 The rationale for differentiating
Africa’s trade with EU countries and other advanced countries is related to the
effect of the Lomé Convention on trade. The long history of preferential trade
embodied in the Lomé Convention has to be controlled for in determining how
typical trade is between Africa and the North. If Africa traded more than expected
with the North because of preferential arrangements, that would not necessarily
shed light on the underlying pattern of trade.13 A free trade agreement dummy
(denoted by FTA) controls for preferential trading relationships.14
For the cross-section data, the main findings on whether Africa undertrades
are as follows (Table 2). First, currently, Francophone Africa is an undertrader in
terms of its overall trade and its trade with the North. The coefficients on the
Francophone dummy are negative and significant for 2000; however, Francophone
Africa’s trade with itself and other developing countries is unexceptional. 
Second, and disturbingly, the respective coefficients have become more neg-
ative over time, signifying increasing disintegration of Francophone Africa from
global trade. For example, Francophone Africa’s overall trade, which was normal
in 1980, was about 70 percent less than average by 2000 (see columns 1 and 3 in
Table 2).15
Third, while Francophone Africa is progressively undertrading, the disintegra-
tion effect is apparently more pronounced in its trade with the North than with any
other group of countries. Between 1980 and 2000, this trade went from being nor-
mal to about 80 percent below average (columns 7 and 9 in Table 2). While the coef-
ficient on trade with the South turned negative between 1980 and 2000, it remained
insignificant. Only its intra-regional trade shows no clear signs of disintegration.
Since technology transfer embodied in capital goods is one of the important chan-
nels for trade to enhance growth (see Coe, Helpman, and Hoffmaister, 1997, for
example), Francophone Africa’s substantial undertrading with its Northern partners,
typically the most important suppliers of capital and high-technology goods, raises
concerns about respective implications for its growth prospects. 
For Anglophone Africa, the results are qualitatively different. In 2000,
Anglophone Africa was an average trader in aggregate, with the coefficient on the
dummy being negative but insignificant, and also an average trader in terms of the
components of trade.
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12Since the study covers the period from 1980 to 2000, this dummy does not cover recent entrants to
the EU.
13Although the non-Lomé industrial countries also grant preferences to Africa under the Generalized
System of Preferences, these are less broad in product coverage and subject to greater restrictions and con-
ditions than preferences granted under the Lomé Convention.
14This dummy is time-varying in the sense that it reflects common membership in a preferential arrange-
ment at the time of (and after) its formal inception. Thus, for 1980, FTA includes the following arrangements:
European Free Trade Association (EFTA), EU-Turkey agreement, the Andean Pact, Australia-New Zealand
agreement, Lomé, and Franc de la Communauté Française d’Afrique (CFA) zone. For 1990, it includes, in
addition to the above, the Israel-U.S. free trade agreement. For 2000, it includes, in addition, the Israel-EU
free trade agreement,Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Free Trade Area (AFTA), Southern
Common Market (MERCOSUR), North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Chile-U.S. free
trade agreement, and the EU-Northern Africa (also called the EU-Mediterranean) agreements.
15The extent of undertrading or overtrading is simply the exponential of the coefficient on the dummy












































Table 2. Africa’s Trade1
Testing for ———————————————————————————————————
Africa’s Trade with the World Intra-African Trade Africa’s Trade with the North Africa’s Trade with the South
Explanatory 1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
GDP 0.994* 0.887* 0.740* 0.994* 0.887* 0.741* 0.993* 0.888* 0.741* 0.995* 0.887* 0.741*
POP –0.203* –0.090 0.113 –0.203* –0.090* 0.113 –0.202* –0.090 0.113 –0.203* –0.090 0.113
DIST –0.400* –0.316* –0.320* –0.400* –0.316* –0.321* –0.400* –0.316* –0.321* –0.400* –0.316* –0.320*
REM 1.151* 0.871* 0.465** 1.151* 0.871* 0.464** 1.149* 0.871* 0.465** 1.151* 0.871* 0.464**
AFR-ANG –0.052 0.202 –0.238
AFR-FRN –0.068 –0.642 –1.169*
AFRAFR-ANG 0.501 1.933 1.238
AFRAFR-FRN –2.193 0.546 –0.119
AFRNNEU-ANG –0.997** 0.603 0.078
AFRNNEU-FRN –0.401 –1.163* –1.634*
AFRS-ANG –1.078** –0.475 –0.469
AFRS-FRN 0.532 0.607 –0.214
ADJ 0.454* 0.400* 0.516* 0.454* 0.400* 0.517* 0.454** 0.400* 0.517* 0.454* 0.400* 0.517*
LNG 0.275 –0.325 0.033 0.275 –0.325 0.031 0.276 –0.325 0.031 0.275 –0.325 0.032
FTA 0.655** 0.782** 0.769* 0.655** 0.783** 0.768* 0.654** 0.782** 0.767** 0.655** 0.783** 0.768*
Adjusted R-squares 0.863 0.873 0.907 0.863 0.873 0.907 0.830 0.873 0.907 0.863 0.873 0.908
F statistic 1,518 1,789 2,561 1,518 1,788 2,560 1,519 1,789 2,560 1,519 1,788 2,560
Number of observations 2,415 2,593 2,613 2,415 2,593 2,613 2,415 2,593 2,613 2,415 2,593 2,613
Source: Authors’estimates.
1*(**) indicates significance at the 5 (10) percent level. See Appendix I for definitions of explanatory variables.Encouragingly, and in contrast with Francophone Africa, Anglophone Africa
shows some signs of reversing its disintegration from trade with the North. The
coefficient, which was negative and significant in 1980 (signifying undertrading of
about 63 percent as column 7 in Table 2 shows) becomes positive by 2000, albeit
insignificantly so (column 9 in Table 2). A similar pattern is exhibited in its trade
with other developing countries and itself. 
Some final remarks can be made on the more general aspects of the results.
Coefficients on the standard determinants of the gravity models, such as income,
population, and distance, are correctly signed, statistically significant, and yield
plausible elasticity estimates broadly in line with those obtained in the literature. 
Besides implications for Africa’s trade, the results also shed light on the ongo-
ing process of globalization more generally. To the extent that globalization con-
notes the decreasing importance of geography, the evidence lends support to this
proposition. The elasticity of trade with respect to distance declined by almost 20
percent (from –.40 in 1980 to –.32 in 2000), with all the decline occurring in the
1990s.16 This is consistent with rapid technological progress and wide-ranging lib-
eralization in the trade-related service sectors during the 1990s. 
IV. Robustness Tests and Explanations for the Contrasting Trade
Performance of Francophone and Anglophone Africa
A number of factors may help explain the dissimilar globalization experiences of
Francophone and Anglophone Africa. Differences in the commodity composition
of trade and in currency arrangements may play a role in this regard. Likewise, dif-
ferences in the efficiency of transport and communication sectors could manifest
themselves in transaction costs and, thus, trade performance. While a detailed
examination of the factors underlying differences in performance of Francophone
and Anglophone Africa is beyond the scope of this paper, we can conduct some
basic tests of the possible explanations. 
Countries in Francophone Africa could be disintegrating from trade because
they are primary commodity exporters.17 In this view, African disintegration
could merely reflect the decline in its terms of trade that has been evident during
the past several decades. To test this, we run regressions including a dummy for
primary commodity exporters (PRIM).18 Table 3 (columns 1–3) contains these
results. The PRIM dummy is positive and significant for 1980 and 1990, sug-
gesting that being a commodity exporter conferred an advantage in those periods.
In 2000, this dummy is insignificant but the sign is still positive. This implies that
commodity exporters are not uniquely disadvantaged in trading terms. More
important for our purposes, the inclusion of the dummy does not alter the basic
results; indeed, they are strengthened. In particular, the Francophone Africa
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16See CST (2002) for more details.
17In our sample, four out of six Francophone countries and six out of ten Anglophone countries are
primary commodity exporters. Therefore, the set of Francophone countries is not intrinsically more com-
modity dependent than the set of Anglophone countries. 












































Table 3. Robustness Analysis1
Primary Commodities Transaction Costs Exchange Rate Misalignments Panel Estimation2
Explanatory 1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000 1980–2000
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
GDP 1.073* 0.899* 0.740* 0.994* 0.887* 0.740* 0.994* 0.888* 0.740 0.798* 0.798*
POP –0.229* –0.096 0.113 –0.203* –0.090 0.113 –0.203* –0.091 0.113 0.021 0.021
DIST –0.414* –0.320* –0.320* –0.400* –0.316* –0.320* –0.400* –0.316* –0.320 –0.370* –0.370*
REM 1.198* 0.867* 0.465* 1.150* 0.871** 0.465 1.151* 0.871* 0.465 0.771* 0.771*
AFR-ANG –0.575 –0.132 –0.240 –0.051 0.204 –0.237 –0.036 0.073
AFR-FRN –0.607 –0.968* –1.170* –0.791* –0.595*
AFR-CFA 0.330 –0.583 –1.080*
DAFR-ANG –0.008 0.023 –0.026
DAFR-FRN –0.009 –0.073 –0.131*
AFR-ANG-TREND –0.009
AFR-FRN-TREND –0.017*
ADJ 0.481* 0.400* 0.516* 0.454** 0.400* 0.516* 0.454** 0.400* 0.516 0.525* 0.525*
LNG 0.252 –0.330 0.033 0.275 –0.325 0.033 0.275 –0.325 0.033 0.000 0.000
FTA 0.725** 0.784 0.769* 0.655 0.782 0.769* 0.656* 0.781 0.769 0.574* 0.574*
PRIM 0.853* 0.497** 0.002
Adjusted R-squares 0.877 0.874 0.907 0.863 0.873 0.907 0.863 0.873 0.907 0.882 0.882
F statistic 1,567 1,637 2,327 1,518 1,789 2,561 1,519 1,789 2,561 13,503 12,659
Number of observations 2,415 2,593 2,613 2,415 2,593 2,613 2,415 2,593 2,613 54,165 54,165
Source: Authors’ estimates.
1* (**) indicates significance at the 5 (10) percent level. See Appendix I for definitions of explanatory variables.
2Panel regressions include unreported time dummies. dummy is negative and significant in both 1990 and 2000. This implies that it is
now an undertrader and has experienced trade disintegration over the last 20
years. For Anglophone Africa, the results are as broadly the same with and with-
out the inclusion of the primary commodity dummy.19
Next we consider if high transport and other trade-related costs are a par-
ticular obstacle for Africa’s trade (Table 3, columns 4–6). The evolution in
these costs would, of course, be affected by certain exogenous factors, such as
technological progress, for example. It also crucially depends on domestic poli-
cies, which determine the efficiency of certain trade-related service industries,
such as transport, port operations, communications, and distribution. Again, the
gravity model allows for some preliminary testing of hypotheses about the
magnitude of trade-related costs and their evolution over time. As discussed
earlier, the distance variable could be considered a proxy for such costs. To test
for their effects on African trade, we interacted a dummy for Anglophone and
Francophone Africa with the distance variable, denoted in Table 3 by DAFR-
ANG and DAFR-FRN, respectively. The results point toward an increase in
trade costs for Francophone Africa that decreases trade by about 11 percent
between 1980 and 2000.20
Another explanation for the differential performance of Francophone and
Anglophone Africa relates to exchange rate misalignments (Table 3, columns
7–9). Countries in the CFA zone have pegged their exchange rate to the French
franc.21 The serious and persistent misalignment of the CFA franc until 1994,
when it was devalued by 50 percent, is widely acknowledged to have had a debil-
itating effect on trade performance of the CFA zone countries. To test for such
misalignment effects, we redefine the Francophone Africa dummy to exclude the
non-CFA zone countries (variable AFR-CFA in Table 3). All the results for
Francophone Africa, including the negative and statistically significant coefficient
for 2000, broadly carry over to the CFA zone countries. While not necessarily con-
clusive, the results are generally consistent with the possibility that years of mis-
alignment in the CFA zone might have led its members to undertrading. Future
research is needed, however, to substantiate this explanation. 
Finally, to confirm that our cross-section estimates for selected years are
generally valid, we estimated the same specification on a panel data set com-
prising annual data for the period 1980–2000. Following CST (2002), we
included (unreported) time dummies to capture the effects of changes in prices
and exchange rates over time. The results are reported in Table 3 (columns 10
and 11) and are consistent with those obtained for the cross-section dataset. 
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19Of course, one explanation for Africa’s disintegration could relate to the increasing vertical spe-
cialization that is a more important feature of manufacturing trade than trade in commodities (Hummels,
Ishii, and Yi, 2001). Vertical specialization means that goods cross multiple borders in the process of being
manufactured, counting as trade each time they do so. Trade thus is a gross rather than a value-added mea-
sure. With Africa specializing in commodities, it is excluded from trade-intensive manufacturing transac-
tions. However, as Figure 1.B shows, Africa’s disintegration (particularly that of Francophone Africa)
appears to be also evident in trade in primary commodities. This is confirmed by the fact that the disinte-
gration results in Table 3 appear to be present, even after controlling for primary commodity dependence. 
20For Anglophone Africa, the distance coefficient is negative in 2000 but insignificant.
21Since 1999, the peg is to the euro.In the specification without a time trend, the Francophone Africa dummy is neg-
ative and statistically significant while that on Anglophone Africa is insignifi-
cant (column 10). In column 11, the Africa dummies are interacted with a time
trend to measure the integration/disintegration effect over time. The trend for
Anglophone Africa is negative but insignificant while that for Francophone
Africa is negative and significant, confirming the trend of disintegration for the
latter set of countries. 
V. Comparison with Earlier Literature
To complement the robustness analysis, we next examine the key factors driving
our results. To test whether our sample selection is the driving factor, we estimate
the model using the methodologies employed by the previous researchers and
restricting our sample accordingly. The results of this calibration exercise are
reported in Table 4, column 1 for the Foroutan and Pritchett (1993) paper and in
columns 2 and 3 for Coe and Hoffmaister (1999). 
Recall that Foroutan and Pritchett (1993) tested whether intra-African trade
was different from trade between other developing countries. Restricting our sam-
ple in line with their study and applying their estimation procedure, we find simi-
lar results—the intra-African trade dummy for 1980 is positive and significant,
albeit at the 10 percent level. 
We then replicate Coe and Hoffmaister’s (1999) results, focusing on North-
South trade in a panel data context. Replicating their setup and the estimation
method, we find that the coefficient for the dummy for Africa’s trade with the
North (AFRNEU) is negative and significant without the time trend; including the
trend makes the coefficient positive but implies a significant disintegration effect
over time. Coe and Hoffmaister (1999) obtain similar results. Thus, we can elim-
inate the sample as the source of the difference.
Next, to isolate the role of the methodology, we reestimate our basic model
(Table 2, columns 1–3) using the methodologies of the previous papers. In this
exercise, methodology is the only difference. The results are reported in Table
4. In columns 4–6, for Foroutan and Pritchett (1993), the coefficients on both
Africa dummies are negative and significant in 1980 and 1990 and both decline
and become insignificant in 2000. Clearly, the use of the Foroutan and Pritchett
methodology thus paints an opposite picture compared to our results, with both
Anglophone and Francophone Africa reversing the process of disintegration
over time. 
The application of the Coe and Hoffmaister methodology yields results
(columns 7–8) that show that the coefficients on the regional dummies as well as
the coefficients of these dummies interacted with the time trend are insignificant.
Again, there is a striking contrast with our results, obtained with bootstrapping,
where the Francophone dummy and its interaction with the time trend are both sig-
nificant. We conclude, therefore, that the key factor driving our results is the
methodology—nonlinear least squares with bootstrapping on a sample including
zero-valued observations—which we consider preferable for reasons explained
earlier (and more fully in CST, 2002). 















































Table 4. Comparison with the Earlier Literature1
Replication of Results Comparison of Methodologies
——————————————— ————————————————————————
Foroutan and  Coe and  
Pritchett (1993)2 Hoffmaister (1999)3 Foroutan and Pritchett (1993)4 Coe and Hoffmaister (1999)5
Explanatory 1980 1980–2000 1980 1990 2000 1980–2000
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
GDP 2.462* 0.462* 0.461* 2.078* 2.066* 1.777* 0.798* 0.798*
POP 0.166 0.388* 0.389* –0.536* –0.611* –0.315* 0.021* 0.021*
DIST –2.701* –0.361* –0.361* –1.166* –0.988* –1.261* –0.370* –0.370*
REM 2.585* 1.044* 1.757* 1.018* 0.771* 0.771*
AFR-ANG –1.610* –0.952* –0.021 –0.036 0.073






ADJ –0.669 1.577* 1.580* –0.380 0.495 –0.319 0.525* 0.525*
LNG 4.560* 0.056* 0.057* 2.631* 2.127* 1.627* 0.000 0.000
FTA 0.925 0.197* 0.194* 1.933* 1.512* 1.073* 0.574* 0.574*
Adjusted R-squares 0.818 0.819 0.882 0.882
F statistic 4,030 3,893 13,503 12,659
Number of observations 974 25,031 25,031 2,415 2,593 2,613 54,165 54,165
Log-likelihood –3066 –7,456 –7,869 –7,814
Wald Chi-squared 376 1,085 1,294 1,399
Source: Authors’ estimates.
1* (**) indicates significance at the 5 (10) percent level. See Appendix I for definitions of explanatory variables.
2Tobit estimation on a sample including South-South trade. Zero-valued observations are replaced with a small positive value.
3Nonlinear least squares without bootstrapping on a panel sample including North-South trade. Zero-valued observations are included.
4Tobit estimation on the full sample. Zero-valued observations are replaced with a small positive value.
5Nonlinear least squares without bootstrapping on the full panel sample. Zero-valued observations are included.VI. Conclusion
The popular “marginalization-from-trade” hypothesis argues that Africa has not
benefited from globalization because it has not globalized in the first place. This
view has been challenged recently in a series of papers, which have shown more
formally that Africa has not been left behind: Africa trades as much as any other
set of traders, given the underlying determinants of trade.
This paper, however, finds support for the “marginalization-from-trade”
hypothesis, but only for Francophone Africa. Francophone Africa is an undertrader
and, moreover, the degree of its undertrading has increased over time. Anglophone
Africa appears to have remained an average trader for the past two decades.
Ominously, Francophone Africa’s trade with the North appears to have suf-
fered most over time: ominous, because trade with the technologically advanced
North is one of the more important channels for globalization’s benefits to be dis-
seminated to Africa. Trade with the North also constitutes the largest component
of Africa’s overall trade and is hence likely to have a more significant impact on
growth. Anglophone Africa, on the other hand, which had undertraded with the
North in 1980, has reversed this process and became an average trader with the
advanced countries by 2000.
The robustness analysis points to two possible explanations for the contrast-
ing performance of Anglophone and Francophone Africa. Trade-related costs
seem to have increased for Francophone Africa. Also, the currency arrangements
in the CFA zone may have exerted a depressing effect on trade, owing to persis-
tent exchange rate misalignments. More research is needed in the future, however,
to substantiate these findings. The results suggest that primary commodity depen-
dence is not a factor in explaining trade developments for Africa consistent with
the decline in Africa’s share of global trade even in primary commodities.
Overall, the results in this paper suggest that the sanguine policy prescription,
stemming from the view that Africa trades adequately, may need to be reconsid-
ered. Policy action to assist Africa to better exploit its trade opportunities would
seem appropriate. Of course, views differ on the nature of such action—from calls
for active government intervention to facilitate export diversification (Sachs,
2000) to the need to maintain competitiveness (World Bank, 2000). At the very
least, trade regimes that continue to be highly distorted in a number of African
countries need to be liberalized (Subramanian and others, 2000).
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APPENDIX I 
Legend and Data Sources
Variable Definition (Source)
Trade Sum of bilateral exports and  imports (Direction of Trade Statistics,I M F )
GDP GDP of the reporting country times the GDP of the partner country (World Economic
Outlook (WEO), IMF)
POP Population of the reporting country times population of the partner country (WEO)
DIST Geographical distance between capitals of the reporting and partner countries (Fitzpatrick
and Modlin, 1986)
REM Remoteness is the weighted distance to all trading partners (as defined in the text)
ADJ Dummy that takes on a value of 1when reporting and partner countries share a common
border 
LNG Dummy that takes on a value of 1 when reporting and partner countries share a common
language (Coe and Hoffmaister, 1999)
AFR-ANG Dummy that takes on a value of 1 when either the reporting or partner country is an
Anglophone African country 
AFR-FRN Dummy that takes on a value of 1 when either the reporting or partner country is a
Francophone African country
AFRS-ANG Dummy that takes on a value of 1 when the reporting or partner country is an Anglophone
African country and the partner or reporting country is a developing country
AFRS-FRN Dummy that takes on a value of 1 when the reporting or partner country is a
Francophone African country and the partner or reporting country is a developing
country
AFRAFR-ANG Dummy that takes on a value of 1 when the reporting and partner country are Anglophone
African countries
AFRAFR-FRN Dummy that takes on a value of 1 when the reporting and partner country are
Francophone African countries 
AFRNNEU-ANG Dummy that takes on a value of 1 when the reporting or partner country is an Anglophone
African country and the partner or reporting country is a non-Lomé industrial country
AFRNNEU-FRN Dummy that takes on a value of 1 when the reporting or partner country is a Francophone
African country and the partner or reporting country is a non-Lomé industrial country
AFR-CFA Dummy that takes on a value of 1 if a country is a member of the CFA currency zone
FTA Dummy that takes on a value of 1 when the reporting or partner country is a member of
one of the free trade or regional integration agreements listed in footnote 14 of the paper
PRIM Dummy that takes on a value of 1 if a country is a primary commodity exporter as defined
in WEO
AFR-CFA Dummy that takes on a value of 1 when reporting and partner countries are members of
the CFA currency zone
DAFR-ANG Dummy that takes on a value of the distance variable when the reporting country is an
Anglophone African country and zero otherwise
DAFR-FRN Dummy that takes on a value of the distance variable when the reporting or partner coun-
try is a Francophone African country and zero otherwise
AFRAFR Dummy that takes on a value of 1 when the reporting and partner country are African
countries
AFR-ANG-TREND The Anglophone Africa dummy (AFR-ANG) variable interacted with a time trend
AFR-FRN-TREND The Francophone Africa dummy (AFR-FRN) variable interacted with a time trend
AFRNNEU Dummy that takes on a value of 1 when the reporting or partner country is an African
country and the partner or reporting country is a non-Lomé industrial country




Africa Francophone Anglophone Lomé CFA Non-Lomé
Africa Africa Industrial
Cameroon Cameroon Ethiopia Cameroon Cameroon Australia
Congo, Dem. Rep. of Congo, Dem. Rep. of Ghana Congo, Dem. Rep. of Congo, Rep. of Austria
Congo, Rep. of Congo, Rep. of Kenya Congo, Rep. of Côte d’Ivoire Canada
Côte d’Ivoire Côte d’Ivoire Malawi Côte d’Ivoire France Finland
Ethiopia Madagascar Mauritius Ethiopia Senegal Iceland
Ghana Senegal Nigeria Ghana Israel
Kenya Tanzania Kenya Japan
Madagascar Uganda Madagascar New Zealand
Malawi Zambia Malawi Norway
Mauritius Zimbabwe Mauritius Sweden
Nigeria Nigeria Switzerland
Senegal Senegal United States

















1Asterisks denote primary commodity exporters.
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